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Abstract
In a model with private information of the worker about her ability and
unobservable eort choice the role of public and private employment services
is analyzed The coexistence of an inecient employment exchange and
an ecient private agency may lead to optimal screening with rst best
contracts This is due to the assumption that good types of workers lose more
human capital than bad types in periods of unemployment or mismatch A
bad type of worker earns an information rent if the employment exchange is
inecient and the employer chooses not to use the private agency
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  Introduction
Public employment services in many countries share the property of dealing
mainly with applicants and jobs of low or middle salaries Smaller rms for
example who search for workers only on a regional level use public services
that are oered for free However highly qualied workers are rarely matched
with jobs at the employment exchange These matches often come about be
cause rms or workers engage in search activities themselves for example
rms announce jobs in newspapers workers pay for employment wanted
advertisements or send their application documents to big wellknown rms
without being asked to do so A third possibility to match workers with
vacancies is intermediation by private employment agencies In a number of
countries they have gained importance over recent years
 
Highly qualied and able workers often prefer engaging in search activities
for an adequate job themselves instead of waiting for a job at the employment
exchange High opportunity costs and the loss of human capital from delays
due to slow or inecient actions of the public service can make it worthwhile
for good workers to incur some costs themselves Similarly employers who
are looking for qualied workers use costly newspaper advertisements or con
tact private employment agencies
It is often argued and it will be assumed in the model that private agencies
whose employees tend to have stronger incentives than public employees are
more ecient They provide good workers with a job rather quickly and cost
lessly but employers must pay a commission fee for these services

Thus
employers trade o the higher cost with the eciency of private agencies
The model presented below shows that there are eciency and distribution
 
In Germany private employment agencies may operate only since August  
Before the market for job intermediation was deregulated the public employment exchange
had a monopoly position with a few exceptions as headhunting for managers private
agencies for artists etc Other countries with coexistence of public and private services
are Denmark Great Britain Ireland the Netherlands Portugal Switzerland and the
United States See Walwei 	
 and 	 In most countries the market share of the
employment exchange only amounts to around  of all successful matches leading to
a regular employment contract In some countries for example in Great Britain and
Germany the public exchange is responsible for 
 of all new matches while in other
countries for example in Switzerland and the US the market share of the public exchange
is not above  See Walwei 	 Thus informal search and private employment agencies
play an important role

In most countries it is forbidden to make workers pay the commission for example
in Germany Great Britain Ireland and the Netherlands but not in Portugal and the
US There are exceptions in Germany for artists models and some other professions
In Switzerland the employee may not be charged more than  of her rst monthly salary
See Walwei 	
 and 	

eects from the coexistence of public and private services These eects are
driven by asymmetric information between the employer and the worker In
particular it is assumed that the worker has private information about her
true ability while the employer only knows the probability distribution over
dierent worker types The model aims at explaining why employers oer
dierent contracts  maybe even at dierent agencies  for one single job
what properties these contracts have and at which employment agency they
are oered
First and not very surprising overall eciency can be increased when e
cient private agencies exist in addition to the public employment exchange
When the public exchange is inecient employers can hire workers via pri
vate agencies and thus prevent high losses

It is shown that there is a second
more subtle eciency eect When both public and private services are used
to hire workers optimal separation of types can be feasible via rst best
contracts Screening is achieved by oering contracts at the two dierent
agencies which destroys the workers incentive to mimic another type
Second bad workers may earn information rents when the employment ex
change is inecient If employers choose not to bypass

the public exchange
bad workers may have an incentive to mimic good workers who must be
compensated for their loss of human capital The paper investigates the
commonly held view that cream skimming of private agencies leads to a
stigmatization of bad workers who remain with the employment bureau It
emerges that a bad worker can in fact be harmed by the employers use of
a private agency but this is due to a loss of information rent and not to
stigmatization
Third the model shows that a good types information rent can be partially
or fully destroyed either by her loss of human capital from a delayed match at
the employment exchange or by the unattractiveness of a bad types contract
oered at the public exchange

It can be argued that newspaper ads in combination with a personnel department
are another fairly ecient way to hire good workers Thus in Germany the public employ
ment exchange did not have a true monopoly position before private agencies appeared
on the market The model encompasses this interpretation as it explains the eects of
segmentation between a public bureau and any other more ecient but costly institution

In the context of natural monopoly bypass means that customers avoid dealing with
the monopolist or major enterprise by making contracts with other often upstream
providers or by supplying the product or service themselves In the labor context the
public employment exchange often has a dominant position for matching workers and em
ployers for example because unemployment benets are paid only to those jobless who
report to the employment exchange or because private employment agencies are forbidden
The employment exchange can be bypassed by using private agencies job advertisements
in newspapers or internal labor markets

The empirical literature on searchrecruitment channels investigates the e
ciency of matching technologies for workers with dierent visible characteris
tics such as prior employment or unemployment

It is sometimes suggested
that public and private job agencies serve dierent markets ie that they
have complementary aims rather than competing with each other However
German evidence suggests that private agencies serve small as well as big
rms that only about two thirds of the workers at private agencies are qual
ied and that  of those matched at a private agency were without a job

Thus clients of public and private agencies cannot simply be distinguished
by visible characteristics such as the level of qualication their profession or
the length of unemployment In this paper an attempt is made to explain
segmentation according to invisible characteristics such as a workers ability
For example a person with a degree in economics could be hired via the
public exchange or via the private agency depending on her unobservable
skills
A number of issues concerning intermediation in general or on specic mar
kets such as nancial housing or labor markets have been discussed in the
literature Whether allocative eciency is enhanced or reduced by deregu
lating the market for employment services depends on at least two eects
On the one hand successful matching may take place more quickly because
private agencies have stronger incentives

and because competition spurs the
eort of the employment exchange due to more regulatory control by com
paring its performance with that of private agencies for example On the
other hand economies of scale from one monopoly institution with a large
number of vacancies and job searchers are lost

However Pissarides 
shows that the public provision of intermediation has its drawbacks He ar
gues that the employment exchange which can be used for free crowds out
private search activities This negative externality leads to more frictional
unemployment
Another source of scale eects is specialized knowledge about job proles
required attributes of applicants etc representing a large xed cost Chan
 points out that there are returns to intermediation because clients can
exploit economies of scale by contracting with an intermediary

See Lindeboom et al 	

See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  Vermittlungen von privaten Agenturen
March  

See Zweifel and Zaborowski 	 whose model focuses on the dierent incentive struc
tures of public and private employment services

Economies of scale can be preserved to some extent if private agencies and the em
ployment exchange cooperate by letting each other use their les exchanging information
etc
	
Apart from scale eects in information acquisition the existence of inter
mediaries employment agencies middlemen etc can be explained by two
ineciencies on a search market First search eorts of agents are not al
ways successful and second there are positive externalities of search because
the search activity of one agent increases the probability of a match for an
other agent
	
Thus agents may search less than in the social optimum
Asymmetric information plays a role on search markets in a number of ways
For example the quality of a private employment agency may not be ob
servable for employers and workers or agents have private information about
their types Marketmakers who sell and buy a commodity have been shown
to reduce this second information problem in a number of ways Garella 

shows that middlemen can increase average quality in a lemons market by
oering random pricing schemes to sellers Biglaiser  assumes that a mid
dleman has a stronger incentive to invest in knowledge about the commodity
than a buyer because he trades it more often In addition middlemen take
an interest in developing a reputation for selling high quality goods These
two eects can lead to welfare gains from having a middleman in the market
Yavas  who also assumes private information of agents about their valu
ations shows that matchmaking can be more protable than marketmaking
which is never the case with common knowledge of valuations
 

This paper addresses the role of matchmaking on the labor market where the
problem of asymmetric information arises quite naturally It oers another
explanation for the role of intermediation in reducing informational asymme
tries without assuming that employment services have superior information
about worker types than employers In contrast to most of the literature
search is not modeled explicitly Instead matching is simply assumed to be
either costly or insecure depending on the matching technology The main
focus of the paper is on screening via dierent institutions or matching tech
nologies Formally the model is related closest to Laont and Tirole  or
 Chapter  who consider cream skimming and bypass in the context of
monopoly regulation
Section  introduces the model In Section 	 optimal contracts under asym
metric information as well as the employers optimal choice between a public
and a private agency are analyzed Section 
 concludes the paper
	
See Diamond 	 and for a specic labor market application Howitt and McAfee 	
 

His main question is under which conditions intermediaries are marketmakers who
buy and sell a commodity themselves or matchmakers brokers who simply match two
agents for a dierent approach to this problem see Hackett 	 However this does not
seem a meaningful question for the labor market as there are moral and legal reasons for
the pervasiveness of matchmaking


 The model
There is one employer with a vacancy and one worker looking for a job The
employer can oer a menu of contracts on a takeitorleaveit basis Each
contract species a wage w that is related to a level of output y and the
employers payo from a contract is the dierence between output and wage
payment y   w
The worker has to put in some positive level of eort to produce an out
put y The disutility of eort is described by the function  which is
increasing and strictly convex in output 
y
  and 
yy
  and satises

yyy
  ensuring that stochastic incentive schemes are nonoptimal The
workers reservation utility is normalized to zero The disutility of producing
a certain output depends on the workers ability her type There are two
possible types of agents denoted by  and  with      and it is assumed
that the disutility of eort is decreasing with the productivity of the worker


  The workers productivity lowers the marginal disutility of producing
a certain output 
y
  Thus the singlecrossing condition of indierence
curves holds The worker is riskneutral and her payo from the contract is
w   y 
There is one private employment agency
  
It secures an immediate match
but the employer has to pay a nite xed commission of F   It is assumed
for simplicity that all matches are successful in that the employment relation
lasts for a suciently long period of time The public agency can be used
for free but it is a bureaucracy which fails to do its job with probability
   where     If the worker is not matched with the employer the
employer gets no prot and the worker no rent but a good type of worker
also loses a nite amount of human capital d   during the period of un
employment which is of uniform length
 
Put dierently d denotes the
dierence between a good and a bad types depreciation of human capital
during unemployment or mismatch
 
If the public agency is inecient and 
is small a good worker expects a signicant loss in human capital as  d
  
A large number of private agencies may increase more competition or decrease loss of
scale eects overall eciency However this has no impact on the features of the optimal
contract analyzed below as long as a private agency matches workers and employers more
quickly than the public exchange
 
Alternatively d can be interpreted as the expected future wage loss due to blank
spaces on the CV during periods of job search
 
Notice that a good type mimicking a bad type is worse o than a bad type if no
match occurs as a bad type gets zero while a good type gets d he can preserve his
reservation utility of zero only by selfemployment This is justied as long as the model
is interpreted as pointing to longterm eects namely the loss of human capital leading
to losses not just in the current period but also in the future which is represented by d

is approaching the maximum loss of d A good types expected rent from a
contract oered at the employment exchange is w   y       d
A worker has the opportunity to become selfemployed
 
in order to prevent
the depreciation of human capital and get the reservation utility of zero
Information is distributed asymmetrically between the employer and the
worker The worker knows her type before signing the contract while the
employer only has a prior distribution over types The probability for a good
type  is denoted by  thus Pr      The employer can use screen
ing contracts in order to separate types With full information assume that
the employer never oers a contract to the bad type at a private agency as
 
y
 
  w
 
  F  	 
Under a rst best contract denoted by y
 
 w
 
 the cost of employing a
bad type when she comes from a private agency is higher than its revenue
Assume further that the probability for a good type is not too high so that
the employer does not want to exclude a bad type of worker The employer
is able to oer dierent contracts at dierent agencies His expected prot
when using only the public employment exchange is
y   w    y   w	 
When the employer uses a private employment agency denoted by the su
perscript r for a good type in addition to the public exchange his expected
prot is
y
r
  w
r
  F     y
r
 w
r
	 	
A bad type still gets the job via the public service but her contract is denoted
by y
r
 w
r
 because it may dier from her contract when a good type is also
hired via the employment exchange Hence the employer contacts a private
agency in addition to the public exchange whenever
y  w    y   w  y
r
  w
r
  F     y
r
  w
r



 
Instead of going into selfemployment the worker can search for a job by herself To
allow for this interpretation it has to be assumed that search activities of good workers
only lead to matches with employers who advertise their jobs or have a good reputation
for example due to learning on and o the job measures exible promotion rules etc
Private search activities and reputation building are not modeled explicitly but they are
captured by F with a slight change in interpretation
 
For notational simplicity let y  y w  w and so forth

for optimally chosen contracts
 
The worker observes the contracts possibly
oered at dierent agencies and decides which one is more protable to her
The timing of the game is as follows
stage  The employer oers two contracts fw yg and fw yg each of them
either at the public exchange or at the private agency
stage  The worker either rejects both contracts or chooses one of them
and if she is matched with the employer production takes place
stage  The employers payo is realized and the worker receives the wage
payment
The function  and the parameters  F  and d are common knowledge
Output y is veriable It is never optimal for the employer to oer the same
contract at both agencies because one of the agencies is always more attrac
tive to him and there is no coordination problem Thus the workers choice of
one of the contracts is equivalent to the choice of one of the agencies Note
that a worker has to decide whether to contact the employment exchange
without knowing whether she will be matched or not She only knows the
contract oer and the probability  with which a match takes place
In the benchmark case of full information the employer observes a workers
type and can thus induce ecient output The employer either maximizes
his prot  subject to the participation constraints
w   y   
w  y      d  
or 	 subject to
w
r
  y
r
   
w
r
  y
r
   	
The rst best contracts are characterized by

y
y    
y
y
r
   
w  y  w
r
 y
r
 

y
y    
y
y
r
   
w  y  
   

d w
r
 y
r
 	
 
It is straightforward to show that also with asymmetric information it is never optimal
to hire both types via the private agency or a good type via the public exchange and a
bad type via the private agency if inequality  holds
 
Optimal output levels y
 
 y
r 
and y
 
 y
r 
at which marginal cost of
eort is equal to marginal benet are independent of the agency at which
the contract is oered Also w
 
 w
r 
 but the optimal wage of a good type
diers between the two agencies as w
 
 w
r 
 At the public employment
exchange a good type must be compensated for her expected loss of human
capital because she can always get the reservation utility of zero by going
into selfemployment The employer uses a private agency i
F     y
 
  y
 
   d	 
Holding F and d xed the employers choice is determined by the eciency
parameter  of the employment exchange The less ecient the public ex
change the more attractive is the private agency In particular the contract
for a good type is oered at the private agency if the cost F is smaller than
the expected loss from no match with a good type at the public exchange
For    it is optimal for the employer to use the public employment ex
change As there is no loss of human capital optimal contracts are the same
at both agencies and the employer wants to save the cost F 
 The optimal contract
In the presence of asymmetric information a good type may be able to earn
an information rent by mimicking a bad type This information rent is equal
to the dierence between a bad and a good types disutility of eort for pro
ducing a certain output Uy  y    y  If  is close to  a good
type does not lose much human capital at the public exchange and gets al
most the full rent But if  is small the expected loss of human capital can
reduce the rent below the reservation utility such that it is more protable
for a good type to stay at home than to look for a job at the employment
exchange
 
In order to satisfy a good workers participation constraint the
employer can either compensate a good type for this loss by paying a higher
wage or he can switch to a private agency
The optimal contracts under asymmetric information for the two scenar
ios with and without bypass are derived Due to the revelation principle
search for the optimal contract can be restricted to direct incentive com
patible mechanisms Following the analysis of Laont and Tirole  or 
Chapter  a variation of the exogenous parameter  yields dierent regimes
characterized by the workers output level her information rent and use or
 
It is assumed that a worker cannot do both wait for a job and work as a selfemployed
at the same time This can be due to time restrictions which make it costly for her to
show up at the employment exchange regularly while working on her own

nonuse of the private employment agency The employers maximization
program P takes the following form
max
yyww
y  w     y   w
subject to
w   y   w  y  
w  y      d  w  y     d  
w   y    
w  y      d   
when all contracts are made via the public agent and P
max
yyww
  y
r
  w
r
  y
r
  w
r
  F 
subject to the constraints
w
r
  y
r
   w
r
  y
r
  
w
r
  y
r
   w
r
  y
r
     d 
w
r
  y
r
    
w
r
  y
r
    	
when the private agency is used For further reference denote the constraints
of program P by IC IC IR and IR and the corresponding constraints
of program P by IC

 IC

 IR

 and IR


In general for every program there are as many possible regimes as there
are possible combinations of binding constraints However some combina
tions can be excluded ex ante using the standard results that pooling is
nonoptimal that for every type either the incentive or the participation con
straint must be binding and that with two types and two dierent contracts
only one incentive constraint can be binding
 
Five possible combinations
of binding participation and incentive constraints remain for program P
The number of possible combinations of binding constraints in program P
is further restricted to three by
Lemma  When the employer uses the private agency a bad types incentive
constraint is never binding
 
See Laont and Tirole citeLaontTirole Chapter  for example

Proof Notice that IC

is not binding for any  if a good type is oered the
rst best contract at the private agency because w
r 
  y
r 
     
The value of the parameter  determines which constraints are binding for
given d and F  Thus the remaining regimes possibly on degenerate inter
vals can be ordered with respect to  with critical parameters 
i
 i   		 

at which regimes change From Table  can be taken that the critical param
eters 
 
and 

for regimes  to 	 are the same with and without use of the
private agency while the parameters 

and 

are only of relevance when
the private agency is not used With bypass optimal contracts are the same
for all    

 because of Lemma 
Table  Binding Constraints
regime public exchange only public exchange and
private agency
  
 
   IC IR IC

 IR

  

 
 
  IC IR IR IC

 IR

 IR

  

 

 	 IR IR IR

 IR

  

 

 
 IR IR IC IR

 IR

   

  IR IC IR

 IR

  Using only the public exchange
First consider the case where only the employment exchange is used for
example because private agencies do not exist or the cost F is too high
Deriving the optimal contracts for every regime yields
 	
Proposition  When the employer uses only the public exchange optimal
contracts may have the following properties depending on the relative size of
 and d
 A good workers information rent is partially or fully destroyed by the
loss of human capital
	 A bad worker earns an information rent

 Optimal screening involves rst best contracts
 	
The suciency conditions of the maximization programs in this and the next section
are satised if 
yy
 

Proof see Appendix  
In order to explain the results of Proposition  the ve possible regimes are
described in some detail The formulas characterizing the optimal contract
in every regime are relegated to the Appendix
For   
 
  where the public employment exchange is fairly ecient a
good types participation constraint is not binding Her information rent at
the public exchange is greater or equal to her expected loss of human capital
U
 
 y
 
  y
 
    
d


which denes 
 
when it holds as an
equality Thus in regime  the standard screening contract results involving
less than optimal output of a bad type and information rents of a good type
For parameter values   

 
 
 in regime  the inequality y
 
   
y
 
      
d  y
 
    y
 
  is satised A good types
loss of human capital is greater than her information rent at y
 
 but smaller
than her rent at y
 
 Thus the participation constraint IR becomes binding
The employer has to increase her wage which losens the incentive constraint
IC Output y

can be increased and is optimal if a good types information
rent is equal to her expected loss of human capital Hence both a good
types participation and incentive constraint are binding Output of a bad
type is still below its ecient level
When the eciency of the public exchange is lower again ie   

 


a good types wage at the employment exchange must be increased up to
a point where she has no incentive to mimic a bad type even if a bad type
produces the ecient output y
 
 This is the case when the expected loss
of human capital exceeds the expected information rent    
d 
y
 
  y
 
  The menu of contracts oered at the employment exchange
is equivalent to the rst best menu with symmetric information ie produc
tion of both types is ecient and information rents are zero regime 	
When the eciency of the employment exchange is characterized by  


 

 a good types contract becomes so attractive that a bad type has an
incentive to mimic her Thus her incentive constraint is binding upwards
This is the case as y

  y

   
d   Put in words a bad
types loss from pretending to be a good type and producing y

is smaller
than the gain of  
d Therefore a good types output is distorted up
wards in order to make the contract less attractive for a bad type Note that
in regime 
 a bad types participation constraint and incentive constraint are
binding over a possibly nondegenerate interval of  parameters because y

is adjusted for every   

 

 so as to make a bad type indierent between
both contracts while keeping her rent at zero
For a very inecient public exchange with    

 a bad types incentive


Subscripts i i     denote optimal wage and output schemes under regime i

to mimic a good type is even stronger such that y

    y

     

d   This means that a bad type wants to produce y

in order to
reap the compensation for human capital depreciation of a good type Her
wage is increased in order to induce truthtelling Thus a bad type earns a
rent
Of course the protability of employing a worker is low when the employ
ment exchange is very inecient and there is no private agency In particular
it becomes very expensive to compensate a good type for her loss of human
capital
Corollary  When  is small enough the employer will not oer a contract
for a good type because costs are higher than benets
Proof Consider
!
"

 y

  y

     y
 
  y
 
   y

   y

 
   d
where
!
"

denotes the employers indirect prot in regime  The prot from
oering a contract for a bad type only    y
 
  y
 
  is positive
even for a very small  but it can become negative for a good type  
In this case only one contract is oered y
 
 w
 
 which is not acceptable
for a good type Excluding a good type if the employment agency is very
inecient reverses the standard result that exclusion of a bad type can be
optimal when the probability of a good type is very high
Since the objective function is concave and the constraints dene a convex
set moving from regime  to  yields a continuous solution for y and w
on  
Note that it is not the possibility to bypass the public exchange which makes
screening with rst best contracts optimal and allows a bad type to earn
rents as in Laont and Tirole 
 
It is the ineciency of the public
exchange together with the dierent propensities of types to lose human
capital which is sucient for rst best screening contracts In the next
section it is shown that when the private agency is used the optimality of
rst best screening contracts holds for a wider range of parameter values but
a bad types opportunity to earn rents is destroyed
 
In the analysis of Laont and Tirole 	 the binding participation constraint of a high
valuation consumer is due to his ability to switch to the bypass rm Here it is the
employer who decides whether to use the public exchange or to bypass it But when a
good workers participation constraint becomes binding because she loses too much human
capital at the inecient employment exchange it may be so expensive to compensate her
for this loss that switching to the private agency is optimal for the employer

  Using the public exchange and the private agency
Now consider under which conditions the employer decides to use the private
agency Here bypass means that the private agency is used to hire good
types whereas bad types are still hired via the public employment bureau
The conditions for regimes  to  when only the public exchange is used
depend on the relationship between  d and information rents which are
determined by the function  the probability  and the types  and 
However the optimality of bypass also depends on F  the cost of using the
private agency Therefore for every regime a critical F can be derived at
which the employer is indierent between bypass and no bypass In addi
tion optimal contracts can be computed for every bypass regime The main
features of these contracts are summarized in
Proposition  When the employer uses both the public exchange and the
private agency optimal contracts may have the following properties depend
ing on the relative size of  and d
 A good workers information rent is partially or fully destroyed by the
unattractiveness of a bad types contract oered at the employment exchange
	 A bad type of worker never earns an information rent

 Optimal screening involves rst best contracts for a wider range of pa
rameter values than without bypass
Proof see Appendix  
In the following the bypass regimes are described brie#y The exact charac
terization of the optimal contracts can be found in the Appendix
Consider a fairly ecient employment exchange with   
 
  such that a
good type earns an information rent

The employer uses a private agency
whenever
F     y
 
  y
 
   U
 
	 

Bypass is optimal if the cost of using the private agency is smaller than the
expected loss from no match with a good type Note that bypass is more
likely with full information because the employers prot from a good type
hired at the public exchange is lower under asymmetric information than
under full information due to information rents Thus the loss from no match
with a good type at the public exchange is also lower under asymmetric in
formation which makes the private agency comparatively less attractive
Production is the same as in regime  without bypass that is output of a

The critical parameter 
 
is dened by 	  d  U
 
as in regime  without
bypass
	
good type is not distorted and a bad type produces less than the optimum
The information rent of a good type at the private agency is the same as her
expected rent  at the public exchange
The optimal bypass condition for   

 
 
 regimes  and 	 is equivalent
to the optimal bypass condition  in the case of full information because
a good type gets the rst best contract in all three instances Condition 
is satised for a higher cost F than condition 
 Thus the less ecient
the public exchange the more attractive is the private agency The critical
parameter 

and optimal contracts in bypass regimes  and 	 are the same
as without bypass the only dierence being that a good type does not have
to be compensated for the expected loss of d at the private agency When
   

 optimal screening with bypass is achieved by the menu of rst
best contracts This follows from Lemma  Hence there are only three
dierent regimes when the private agency is used The main result that
optimal screening involves rst best contracts if    

 can be given a
simple intuitive explanation If the employer oers the rst best contract of
a good type at the private agency a bad type does not nd this contract
attractive When a good type goes to the employment exchange in order to
mimic a bad type she is not compensated for the expected loss of human
capital which is greater than her information rent Therefore neither of the
incentive constraints is binding and output is equal to its rst best level
Screening is not achieved by the wageoutput scheme but by the eciency
dierential between public and private services and the dierence between
types with respect to human capital depreciation
Finally it can be shown that there is always a degree of ineciency of the
public exchange that makes bypass optimal for the employer and conversely
a degree of ineciency at which no bypass is optimal
Proposition  For any given parameters d and F  there exist two parameter
values 
 
 
  
   such that for   
 
the employer prefers using both
the public and the private agency and for   
  
the employer uses only the
public exchange
Proof Denote the employers indirect prot from the optimal menu of con
tracts in regime i i   			  by
!
"
i
when he does not use the private agency
and in regime j j   			 	 by
!
"
r
j
when he uses it As lim


!
"
i
  and
lim


!
"
r
j
  bypass is optimal for    If   
!
"
i

!
"
r
j
because F  
The continuity of the employers indirect prot functions
!
"
i
 i   			 
and
!
"
r
j
 j   			 	 as y and w are continuous in  see above implies
that the parameters 
 
and 
  
exist  


   Summary of results
The ndings of Proposition  and  can be summarized in the following
gures
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Figure  Optimal output scheme
Figure  shows rst and second best output levels for both types depending
on the size of  First best output is constant in  but second best output
is distorted upwards for a good type at a low  and downwards for a bad
type at a high  When the private agency is used output of a good type is
never distorted shown by the dashed line
However  not only aects the optimal output level of the contract but also
the probability that production takes place at all Figure  shows expected
output in the ve regimes Expected output with full information when only
the public exchange is used is a straight line connecting zero with y
 
and y
 
at    Expected second best production may again be above or below
this line When the public exchange is bypassed expected output of a good
type jumps up to the dashed line
In Figure 	 rst best wage levels are represented by a horizontal line for a
bad type while a good types wage at the public exchange is decreasing in
 because she is compensated for the expected loss of human capital First
best wages of a good type hired at the private agency are constant in  A
good types wage at the employment exchange and at the private agency is
above the rst best wage in regime  Bypass pushes the wage of a good type
down to the dashed line in all regimes Second best wages of a bad type are
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Figure  Expected output
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Figure 	 Optimal wage scheme

below the optimum w
 
in regime  and  and above the optimum in regime
 but bypass decreases the wage in regime 
The net rent U of a worker contacting an employment agency is dened as
the sum of expected benets from the contract and human capital losses
U  w  y      d
with d   for a bad type Figure 
 shows that a bad type earns a rent
in regime  but this rent is destroyed when the employer uses the private
agency However a good type always earns a rent in regime 
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Figure 
 Net rent
 Conclusion
The paper highlights the screening function of dierent coexisting matching
technologies A model of asymmetric information is used to explain the al
location of worker types to dierent employment institutions It is shown
that employers can screen workers by oering dierent contracts at dierent
institutions for one single job Using both the private agency and the public
exchange may entail ecient production under asymmetric information but
bypass is neither necessary nor sucient for allocative eciency However
the range of parameter values for which optimal screening implies rst best
production increases when the private agency is used
There are some serious limitations of the model which should be taken into
account First as there is no competition among workers the probability of
nding a job does not depend on ones ability or on currently being employed
or unemployed However empirical research suggests that employed workers
have a higher probability of nding a new job than unemployed workers

When workers compete the optimal screening mechanism exhibits the same

See for example Lindeboom et al 	
 
output distortions as with one single worker but lower information rents
separation property

Thus the results of the paper remain valid if a
limited number of workers compete although competition weakens the rent
eects of screening via dierent employment agencies
Second the eciency of the public exchange is exogenous in the model al
though it is an important question whether competition of private agencies
enhances the eciency of the bureaucracy
Third in order to compare overall welfare with and without bypass and to
evaluate whether the employers choice of agencies is ecient not only the
level of production but also the probability of a match must be taken into
account Thus from a welfare point of view it can be meaningful to ask
whether increasing the eciency of the employment exchange is desirable
but this is beyond the scope of this model The model shows however that
two potential ineciencies the asymmetry of information and the slowness of
the public exchange do not necessarily add up or reinforce each other The
eect of the information asymmetry on optimal contracts can be neutralized
by an inecient employment exchange Thus the sorting eect of the slow
bureaucracy the cost of increasing the employment exchanges eciency via
regulation and the cost of frictional unemployment due to delayed matching
must be weighed against each other in order to choose the right policy What
should have emerged from the analysis however is that regulating the pub
lic exchange or deregulating the market for employment services has some
unexpected eciency and distribution eects when asymmetric information
is taken into account
Appendix
Proof of Proposition  Solve the constrained maximization program for
every possible set of binding constraints The results are summarized below
 In regime  with binding constraints IC and IR optimal contracts are
characterized by
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Proof of Proposition  Solve the constrained maximization program for
every possible set of binding constraints The results are summarized below
 In regime  the optimal contract has the following properties
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 In regime  the optimal contract is characterized by
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Consider the incentive constraints to verify that they are in fact not
binding
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Constraint IC

is satised because the left hand side is zero and the
right hand side is negative For all    

 we know that   

d  y
r 
    y
r 
  Thus the right hand side of IC

is
negative while the left hand side is zero
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